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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 288

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 13/01/2002

Where it occurred: not made available

Country: Kuwait

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: KMOD 53/SER 44

Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K11

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: VS 1.6 AT blast

Ground condition: sandy

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate communications (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate equipment (?)

Accident report
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in
Kuwait at the time of the accident.
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The victim had arrived in Kuwait on 14th July 1991, so had been working there for six months.
He was employed as an accountant.
A commercial company had been given an extensive contract to clear many areas in Kuwait.
The company’s management decided to give a better understanding of “Life in the field” to
some of the office workers and a two-day recce was organised. The Oilfield Operations
Manager was responsible for the first day, which was a visit to the barrier minefield in the
south of Kuwait. This was a 1½ hour’s drive from the base and so on the edge of the radio
coverage for vehicle mounted Motorola radios. There was no alternative communications
system available at that time, so it was essential for people to “book out and in” with the ops
room. They also had to provide detail of their proposed route and specify check in times. The
company had two operations rooms, one a the HQ and one in the oilfields.
On the first day, two vehicles took two passengers from the office to visit the barrier
minefields near the Kuwait/Saudi southern border. A “Hospital Trauma pack” and a VHF radio
were carried in one vehicle. The recce was successful and went without accident.
On the second day, the two most senior country Managers in the commercial demining
company went on the recce. They took a different vehicle (without radio or trauma pack). As
on the previous day, the intention was to visit a part of the main barrier minefield laid by the
Iraqis, which was believed to be easily identified by a wire fence on each side. The plan was
to approach from the North, and stop at the home (North) fence, to observe the mines.
Instead of a Manager driving each vehicle, inexperienced office personnel travelled in one
vehicle and the two Managers went in the second. The Manager’s vehicle led the way. Both
vehicles were Land Rover Discoveries (petrol) but only one was equipped with a vehicle
radio. The other had a hand held radio.
The Managers in the lead vehicle were unfamiliar with the details of the area they visited and
were apparently unfamiliar with the conventions of minefield marking used. As a result, the
vehicles were not approaching a South facing minefield as they expected, but a North facing
one. There had been a large Iraqi position there and a “C” shaped minefield had been laid to
protect it. The normal South facing minefield was in place until it met the main N/S highway
from Kuwait City to Saudi Arabia. The minefield then turned and ran along the road for
several hundred metres before turning West. This meant that the low enemy side of the fence
was the first fence that would be seen by anyone approaching from the North. Minefields in
the area were conventionally marked with a low (20cm) fence on the enemy side and a high
(2 meter) fence on the home side.
There was an access track running alongside the “low” enemy fence. There was a minefield
clearance team close by and they used the track during their work.
When the two managers arrived in the area they drove on the access track. They saw the two
meter high home-side fence and did not realise that it was far too high to be the “enemy”
fence, or wonder why the access track was so far away from the minefield. Neither did they
notice a breach through the minefield (made by the “Big Red One” machine) less than 100
metres away from the accident site. The mechanical breach started from the access track and
ended at the home fence. It did not continue past it into the area believed by the Managers to
be the minefield. The breach was obvious and clearly marked, so indicating where the mined
area was.
The Managers turned off the track and drove up to the fence. In doing so they drove straight
through the minefield followed by the victims in their vehicle. The lead vehicle drove through
three or four rows of VS1.6 anti-tank mines. The following vehicle, with the office staff and the
only vehicle radio, activated a VS1.6 anti-tank mine as it followed.
The R/H front wheel activated the mine and the blast/debris shattered the R/H passenger
wheel assembly and window. The victim’s face was injured by metal components from the
wheel and brake assembly being driven through the floor of the vehicle. The blast destroyed
the vehicle’s radio.
The minefield clearance team working nearby came when they heard the explosion to help
get the victims out. The Managers went to the damaged vehicle to render first aid. They
extracted the casualty, who had severe facial injuries to his R/H side. The victim later said
that his feet were fortuitously on the left hand side of the foot-well, so escaped serious injury.
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Using the undamaged vehicle (which was driven out of the minefield after a route had been
cleared by hand), the Managers transported the victim and his colleague (who was in shock)
to the hospital at Ahmadi.
They tried to call for assistance on the hand-held radio, but were out of range. By the time
they were in range and could pass a message it was not possible to launch a helicopter
because weather conditions were bad at the helicopter base and hospital. The casualty was
transported by vehicle towards the hospital and met a US Army medical team on the road.
The army medics gave first aid and stabilised the casualty.
The victim, after major facial reconstructive surgery over several years, made a full recovery.
He is reported to have been continuously employed by the demining company and to now
(2001) be the personnel manager.
The Managers later claimed that the Bedouin had taken the minefield fence away, but the
low “enemy” fence was still in place (as witnessed by people who worked at the site on the
following day).

Victim Report
Victim number: 364

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Face
severe Head
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because
the victim was led into a minefield by the demining group’s country Managers who had not
recognised the danger they drove into. The Managers had not researched the area they
visited and did not take elementary precautions regarding communications and trauma
equipment. It is possible that they themselves were inadequately trained or prepared for the
clearance tasks in Kuwait. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
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